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Abstract 
Since January 1st the European Union has launched an EU-internal emissions trading 
scheme (EU ETS) for emission-intensive installations as the central pillar to comply with 
the Kyoto Protocol. The EU ETS may be linked at some time to a Kyoto emissions 
market where greenhouse gas emission allowances of signatory Kyoto countries can be 
traded. In this paper we investigate the implications of Russian market power for 
environmental effectiveness and regional compliance costs to the Kyoto Protocol taking 
into account potential linkages between the Kyoto emissions market and the EU ETS. We 
find that Russia may have incentives to join the EU ETS as long as the latter remains 
separated from the Kyoto international emissions market. In this case, Russia can exert 
monopolistic price discrimination between two separated markets thereby maximizing 
revenues from hot air sales. The EU will be able to substantially reduce compliance costs 
when it does not restrain itself to EU-internal emission regulation schemes. However, part 
of the gains from extra-EU emissions trading will come at the expense of environmental 
effectiveness as (more) hot air will be drawn in. 
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Non-Technical Summary 
Under the Kyoto Protocol Russia has been granted much more emission rights than it is 
presumed to need for its business-as-usual economic development. The substantial 
amount of excess emission rights – often referred to as hot air – will enable Russia to 
behave strategically on the international carbon emissions trading market by rationing 
permit supply. Based on numerical simulations with a simple multi-sector, multi-region 
(partial equilibrium) model of carbon abatement and emissions trading, we investigate the 
implications of Russian market power for environmental effectiveness and regional 
compliance costs to the Kyoto Protocol taking into account potential linkages between the 
Kyoto emissions market and the recently created EU-internal emissions market. We find 
that Russia may have incentives to join the EU ETS as long as the latter remains 
separated from the Kyoto international emissions market. In this case, Russia can exert 
monopolistic price discrimination between two separated markets thereby maximizing 
revenues from hot air sales. The EU will be able to substantially reduce compliance costs 
when it does not restrain itself to EU-internal emission regulation schemes. However, part 
of the gains from extra-EU emissions trading will come at the expense of environmental 
effectiveness as (more) hot air will be drawn in.  
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1.  Introduction 
On February 16th 2005 the Kyoto Protocol entered into force upon prior ratification by 
Russia. Despite the withdrawal of the United States – the world’s major emitter of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gases – the Kyoto Protocol is often praised as a milestone in 
international climate policy because (i) it is the first regime to impose binding greenhouse 
gas emission limits on industrialized countries and (ii) it builds on flexible mechanisms to 
facilitate efficient implementation of emission abatement requirements. In January 2005, 
i.e. shortly before the coming-into-force of the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union 
started off an EU-internal emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) as the central pillar of 
European climate policy to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. 
Against this background, we investigate the strategic climate policy options for Russia 
emerging from its role as dominant permit supplier on international emission markets: 
Russia has been granted much more emission rights under the Kyoto Protocol than it is 
expected to need for its business-as-usual economic development. Note, that this point 
has been made before in the literature (see the next section for a review). The innovative 
contribution of the present paper consists of the consideration of the EU ETS under 
Russian market power within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol. The potential market 
differentiation between the EU ETS and the Kyoto international emissions market may 
have considerable implications for Russia. How should the country ration its excess 
emission rights – often referred to as hot air – in order to maximize national revenues 
when taking into account potential linkages between the Kyoto emissions market and the 
EU ETS? What are the implications of Russia’s strategic policy options for regional 
compliance costs and environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol?  
Based on numerical analysis with a model of carbon abatement possibilities by regions 
and sectors we find that Russia may have incentives to join the EU ETS as long as the 
latter remains separated from the Kyoto international emissions market. In this case, 
Russia can exert monopolistic price discrimination between two separated markets 
thereby maximizing revenues from hot air sales. The EU will be able to substantially 
reduce compliance costs when it does not restrain itself to EU-internal emission 
regulation schemes. However, part of the gains from extra-EU emissions trading will 
come at the expense of environmental effectiveness as (more) hot air will be drawn in.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by describing 
the current institutional framework of international climate policy and laying out different 
strategic climate policy options for Russia; it furthermore summarizes the main insights 
of the relevant previous literature. Section 3 presents the analytical framework which is 
used for numerical simulations of selected climate policy scenarios based on empirical 
and projected data. Section 4 motivates the policy scenarios under investigation. Section 
5 discusses simulation results. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  International Climate Policy: What is at Stake? 
Within the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change the 
industrialized countries (so-called Annex B countries) committed themselves to reduce 
their emissions for the period 2008 to 2012 by specific amounts relative to 1990. Based 
on experts’ projections of future emission trajectories, these commitments imply effective 
cutbacks from business-as-usual (BaU) for most signatory Kyoto parties. However, some 
countries – most notably Russia – are expected to have BaU emissions that fall 
substantially short of the national emission budgets as granted under the Kyoto Protocol. 
These excess emission rights – commonly referred to as hot air – have generated some 
discussion in the literature (see, e.g., Bernard et al. (2003), Böhringer (2000), Klepper and 
Peterson (2005), Michaelowa and Koch (1999), Paltsev (2000)). The main insight of this 
literature is that the supply of hot air will lower the international permit price 
significantly. However, the results depend on the assumptions regarding the strategic 
behavior on the supply side as well as on the strength of terms of trade effects. According 
to the data used in the present study (EU (2003) and DOE (2005)), the Russian hot air 
amounts to 615 MtCO2. 
The Kyoto Protocol allows for flexible instruments which may be used by signatory 
parties to reduce their compliance costs: International Emissions Trading (IET) between 
industrialized countries as well as project-based Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) with hosts either in industrialized (JI) countries or 
developing countries (CDM). Among these instruments, IET may be used to generate 
income from sales of hot air. Independent from the meanwhile legally binding status of 
the Kyoto Protocol, the EU has pushed forward an EU-internal emissions trading system 
for energy-intensive sectors – the so-called EU ETS – as a key market-based instrument 
to implement its Burden Sharing Agreement (EU (1999)). The latter defines national 
emission reduction targets across EU Member States in consistency with the aggregate 
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EU commitment under the Kyoto Protocol. Energy-intensive sectors (installations) which 
are covered by the EU ETS (in the following DIR sectors) are able to trade permits 
among each other. However, the current EU ETS implies a hybrid regulation scheme as 
other sectors (in the following NDIR), such as households or transport, are not covered 
and therefore require complementary regulation in each EU Member State to comply with 
the national targets as prescribed by the Burden Sharing Agreement. The carbon emission 
sources in the EU are therefore subject to different regulatory regimes that are not directly 
linked to each other via flexible instruments. This segmentation of the EU carbon market 
induces efficiency losses from restricted “where-flexibility”: Although marginal 
abatement costs across DIR sectors within the EU will be equalized, they might differ 
substantially from the marginal abatement costs in the NDIR sectors of each EU Member 
State. In fact, the excess costs can be substantial if the NDIR sectors would be regulated 
by purely domestic policies only (see, e.g., Böhringer et al. (2005), Klepper and Peterson 
(2004)). Note, however, that EU governments may use international emissions trading at 
the governmental level to equalize at least marginal abatement costs across all NDIR 
sectors. 
In assessing the institutional climate policy background, it should be noted that there are 
two important differences between the emissions market under the EU ETS and the IET 
established under the Kyoto Protocol. Firstly, under the Kyoto IET countries themselves 
are trading emissions while the EU ETS is strictly firm (installation) based. Secondly, the 
Kyoto Protocol covers the aggregated emissions of a country while the EU ETS is 
restricted to the energy-intensive DIR sectors and covers only roughly half of the total EU 
emissions. These differences between EU ETS and Kyoto IET are of critical importance 
for Russia’s strategic options in international climate policy. Given larger amounts of hot 
air, Russia may act as a dominant player on the IET market, thereby rationing hot air 
supply to maximize its own profit. By focusing on Russia in this study we neglect 
possible strategic options for the remaining countries of the Former Soviet Union (i.e. 
without Russia and the Baltic States). However, taking into account that this region (in 
the following denoted as “XSU”) comprises 11 heterogeneous countries with different 
policy interests the assumption of non-strategic behavior for the XSU region seems to be 
justified.1 
                                                 
1 The XSU region disposes of 334 MtCO2 hot air. According to the GTAP classification this region 
comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, 
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In our subsequent analysis, we focus on three possible future climate policy regimes. 
Firstly – as envisaged by the Kyoto Protocol – there is the option of IET for all signatory 
countries (including the EU). If emission markets were competitive, previous research on 
the Kyoto Protocol suggested that hot air will drive down environmental effectiveness 
and compliance costs eventually to zero (see e.g. Böhringer (2002)). Monopolistic 
rationing of hot air on behalf of Russia may, however, ensure positive marginal 
abatement costs, and thus some effective emission reduction (see e.g. Böhringer and 
Löschel (2003)). Secondly, there is the possibility that the EU will continue to implement 
its Kyoto target internally: The EU ETS applies to DIR sectors within the EU and 
Member States use an emissions trading similar to the Kyoto IET for their NDIR sectors 
within the EU only. At the same time all other signatory Kyoto parties join the IET 
market with Russia maximizing revenues through monopolistic supply of hot air. In this 
setting, it may be possible that EU Member States make use of the Kyoto IET on the 
global market for their NDIR sectors while the EU ETS for DIR sectors remains 
separated. Thirdly, one may imagine a regime where Russia leans towards – or possibly 
joins – the EU ETS (which is separated from the Kyoto market) and at the same time 
takes part in the Kyoto IET and maximizes hot air revenues there. In this case, Russia has 
an interest to avoid a fragmentation of its hot air supply to the EU ETS, as hot air permits 
issued to Russian DIR firms would dilute its market power. Thus, one might consider a 
situation where Russia manages a pooling of its EU ETS permit supply:2 Price 
discrimination on both – the EU ETS market as well as the IET Kyoto market – might 
then be an attractive option for Russia to maximize revenues from hot air sales.  
3. Analytical Framework 
We investigate the implications of Russian market power under different assumptions of 
market linkages with a simple multi-sector, multi-region model of carbon abatement and 
emissions trading.3 The partial equilibrium model is based on marginal abatement cost 
curves for the DIR and NDIR sectors across signatory countries of the Kyoto Protocol: 
Marginal costs of abatement vary considerably across countries and sectors due to 
                                                                                                                                                  
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Given the UNFCCC data on CO2 emissions (UNFCCC (2006)) 
Ukraine (47%), Kazakhstan (20%) and Uzbekistan (11%) hold the largest shares of CO2 emissions among 
the members of the XSU region.  
2 Article 28 of the EU ETS Directive (Directive 2003/87/EC) concedes this option. See Golub and Strukova 
(2004) for a similar reasoning. 
3 For a detailed description of the model see http://brw.zew.de/simac. 
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differences in carbon intensity, initial energy price levels, or the ease of carbon 
substitution possibilities.  
In order to obtain country-specific marginal abatement cost curves for the DIR and NDIR 
sectors, we make use of the PACE model - a standard multi-region, multi-sector CGE 
model (for a detailed algebraic exposition see Böhringer (2002)) which is based on the 
most recent consistent accounts of national production and consumption and bilateral 
trade and energy flows for the year 2001 (as provided by the GTAP 6 database).4 We 
perform a sequence of carbon tax scenarios for each region relevant to our analysis where 
we impose uniform carbon taxes (starting from 0 to 100 $US per ton of carbon). We 
thereby generate a large number of marginal abatement costs, i.e., carbon taxes, and the 
associated carbon emission reductions in DIR and NDIR sectors.  
The discrete data can be fitted to continuous marginal abatement cost curves by an 
ordinary least-square approach. For the empirical specification of sectoral marginal 
abatement costs curves across regions i we adopt a polynomial of third degree: 
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∂−  is the marginal cost of reducing carbon emissions in country i, ie  are the 
BaU emissions, and ei are the actual emissions, i.e. iii eea −=  denotes the level of 
abatement.  
Table 6 in the Appendix provides a summary of the least-square estimates for the 
coefficients i,1α , i,2α  and i,3α  of marginal abatement cost curves. As an illustration the 
marginal abatement costs for selected regions are depicted in Figure 1.5 The differences 
in the marginal costs corresponding to the country-specific reduction target in the Kyoto 
Protocol are substantial. Obviously, there exists a large potential for aggregate cost 
savings by equalizing marginal abatement cost via trading of emission permits. 
                                                 
4 See Dimaranan and McDougall (2006) for the GTAP 6 database. 
5 Note that the marginal abatement costs in Figure 1 and Table 4 are defined in $US per ton of CO2 while 
the coefficients in Table 6 refer to marginal costs in $US per ton of carbon. 
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Figure 1: Marginal Abatement Costs for Selected Regions 
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4. Policy Scenarios 
In our quantitative simulations, we distinguish two important dimensions of the near-term 
international climate policy regime: (i) the linkage between the Kyoto IET and the EU 
ETS (respectively the NDIR sectors of the EU), and (ii) the ability of Russia to exert 
market power. 
We specify six policy scenarios to illustrate what is at stake in international climate 
policy during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol: 
NTr: All Annex B countries achieve their reduction target domestically. This is 
equivalent to a situation in which Annex B countries apply domestic 
carbon taxes that are high enough to meet their individual Kyoto 
commitments. 
Kyoto-C:  All Annex B countries are allowed to trade emission permits among each 
other. All regions behave as price takers, i.e., perfect competition in the 
international permit market is assumed. 
Kyoto:  This scenario is the same as Kyoto-C but with market power by Russia on 
the supply side, i.e., Russia is able to ration its hot air and to choose the 
profit maximizing price for its permits. 
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EU-Closed:  This scenario considers an intra-EU implementation of Kyoto targets. DIR 
sectors take part in the EU ETS and the EU member states may only 
exchange permits for their NDIR sectors between each other, i.e. there is 
no linkage between the Kyoto IET and the EU ETS and the NDIR sectors. 
As in scenario Kyoto Russia has market power in the IET. 
EU-NDIR-Tr: This scenario is the same as EU-Closed, but the EU member states are now 
able to cover permit demand for their NDIR sectors from the Kyoto 
market. That implies a link between both markets and therefore additional 
demand on the Kyoto market compared to EU-Closed. 
EU-RUS:  This scenario is the same as EU-NDIR-Tr, but Russia is now able to take 
part as a dominant supplier with market power in the separated EU ETS, 
i.e. there is now a linkage between the EU ETS and the Kyoto IET via 
Russia. As before, Russia has market power in the Kyoto IET, i.e. the 
country acts as monopolist on two separated permit markets. 
Table 1 summarizes briefly the central features of our six climate policy scenarios. Note 
that the first three scenarios – NTr, Kyoto-C, and Kyoto – have been discussed in the 
previous literature (see e.g. Böhringer and Löschel (2003)) and are reconsidered for the 
sake of comparison and benchmarking. 
Table 1: Policy Scenarios 
Market linkage: Kyoto IET with Russian market power in 
 
EU ETS EU NDIR Kyoto IET EU NDIR EU ETS 
NTr - - - - - 
Kyoto-C yes yes no - - 
Kyoto yes yes yes - - 
EU-Closed no no yes no No 
EU-NDIR-Tr no yes yes yes No 
EU-RUS yes yes yes yes Yes 
 
5.  Simulation Results 
Our analysis focuses on the total compliance costs (see Table 2) and the emission 
reduction in per cent of BaU emissions (see Table 3). We begin the interpretation of 
results with the NTr case. Without permit trading, each Annex B country has to meet its 
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reduction target exclusively by domestic action. The associated marginal abatement costs 
are listed in Table 4 and visualized for selected regions in Figure 1. Compliance to the 
Kyoto Protocol without trade induces substantial adjustment cost, which amount to more 
than 11000 m $US. The highest costs are borne by Canada and Japan.  
Table 2: Compliance Costs in m $US (2001) 
 NTr Kyoto-C Kyoto EU-Closed EU-NDIR-Tr EU-RUS 
Russia 0    0 -511 -179 -560 -634 
XSU* 0    0 -733 -684 -1100 -1100 
Canada 5713    0 474 444 681 681 
Japan 2670    0 539 507 760 760 
European Union 2810    0 516 1339 659 628 
  Austria 90    0 24 111 33 31 
  Belgium 17    0 16 103 27 34 
  Germany 205    0 129 454 171 164 
  Denmark 15    0 8 -3 8 4 
  Spain 675    0 132 632 179 169 
  Finland 0    0 -7 -68 -12 -12 
  France 318    0 98 427 135 130 
  United Kingdom 24    0 24 -141 22 17 
  Greece 89    0 31 154 43 41 
  Ireland 207    0 25 136 35 35 
  Italy 280    0 104 659 157 167 
  Netherlands 55    0 47 293 72 80 
  Portugal 326    0 36 199 51 50 
  Sweden 1    0 0 -19 -1 0 
  Baltic States 0    0 -83 -550 -122 -123 
  Czech Republic 0    0 -98 -679 -145 -144 
  Hungary 0    0 -7 -77 -12 -12 
  Poland 0    0 -86 -726 -134 -137 
  Slovakia 0    0 -16 -111 -23 -22 
  Rest of Europe 510    0 138 548 178 159 
All 11193    0 284 1427 440 334 
* Rest of Former Soviet Union (without Russia and the Baltic States). 
 
There are two major determinants in our partial equilibrium framework for the country-
specific compliance cost. Firstly, the effective reduction requirement a country has to 
fulfill as compared to its reference emission level (here: BaU emissions in 2010). The 
column NTr in Table 3 indicates the effective reduction requirement for each region 
under the Kyoto Protocol. The higher the effective reduction requirement the higher are 
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ceteris paribus the associated compliance costs. Secondly, the ease of carbon abatement is 
captured by the shape of the marginal abatement cost curves. The steeper the marginal 
abatement costs the more costly a given reduction becomes ceteris paribus. Japan and 
Canada stand out for rather high costs due to high effective reduction targets as well as 
difficulties to substitute away from carbon. Countries committed under the Kyoto regime 
with zero compliance costs under NTr do not face a binding emission target, i.e. they 
typically dispose of hot air. Countries with hot air mainly comprise the new EU accession 
states (Baltic States, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) as well as Russia and 
the XSU region. In total, emission reduction under NTr amounts to 11% vis-à-vis the 
BaU for all countries complying to Kyoto. 
Table 3: Emission Reduction in per cent of BaU Emissions (2010) 
 NTr Kyoto-C Kyoto EU-Closed EU-NDIR-Tr EU-RUS 
Russia 0        0 0 0 0 0 
XSU* 0        0 3.8 3.6 5.7 5.7 
Canada 34.7        0 2.4 2.3 3.4 3.4 
Japan 23.2        0 3.4 3.2 4.8 4.8 
European Union 10.9        0 4.2 8.0 4.6 3.1 
  Austria 21.0        0 3.7 8.0 4.1 2.9 
  Belgium 12.4        0 11.8 17.6 12.6 6.9 
  Germany 9.5        0 3.9 7.5 4.3 3.0 
  Denmark 10.5        0 3.8 6.1 4.1 2.6 
  Spain 22.5        0 3.1 6.0 3.4 2.3 
  Finland 0        0 5.9 9.0 6.3 4.0 
  France 12.9        0 2.5 6.9 2.9 2.3 
  United Kingdom 4.1        0 3.8 8.8 4.3 3.2 
  Greece 15.8        0 3.2 5.3 3.4 2.2 
  Ireland 27.8        0 4.1 7.3 4.4 3.2 
  Italy 13.5        0 3.1 6.0 3.4 2.3 
  Netherlands 17.4        0 9.3 14.1 9.9 5.5 
  Portugal 27.1        0 3.1 5.3 3.4 2.4 
  Sweden 2.5        0 5.0 9.1 5.5 3.7 
  Baltic States 0        0 3.7 7.8 4.2 3.0 
  Czech Republic 0        0 8.4 14.4 9.1 5.9 
  Hungary 0        0 4.3 8.9 4.8 3.3 
  Poland 0        0 5.5 10.8 6.2 4.3 
  Slovakia 0        0 9.7 13.7 10.2 5.8 
  Rest of Europe 14.6        0 2.5 4.5 2.7 1.8 
All 11.0        0 3.1 4.8 3.8 3.0 
* Rest of Former Soviet Union (without Russia and the Baltic States). 
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Under competitive Annex B emissions trading (scenario Kyoto-C), the permit price 
equals zero, since the amount of hot air exceeds the total amount of the emission 
reduction requirements. Consequently, the total as well as country-specific compliance 
costs for meeting the Kyoto targets are zero, i.e. total gains from trade amount to about 
11000 m $US. However, there is no emission reduction at all with respect to BaU, i.e. 
Kyoto boils down to business-as-usual. Annex B emissions in 2010 remain unchanged. 
Therefore, this scenario reproduces insights from earlier analysis in the literature (see, 
e.g., Böhringer (2002), Klepper and Peterson (2005)). 
Under monopoly power in scenario Kyoto, Russia exerts market power by rationing hot 
air to maximize net revenues. Russia sells 246 MtCO2, i.e. 40% of its hot air (see Table 
5). Although environmental effectiveness is no longer zero, total emission reduction 
amounts to only 3.1% of aggregate BaU emissions, i.e. the environmental effectiveness 
falls by more than 70% as compared to purely domestic Kyoto implementation. The CO2 
value per ton amounts to 2.1 $US (see Table 4). Compared to NTr, the scenario Kyoto is 
on the one hand more cost-efficient since – except for Russia with marginal abatement 
costs of zero – marginal values of carbon dioxide across all competitive regions are 
equalized. On the other hand, rationing of hot air by Russia induces some excess costs as 
compared to a truly competitive situation.6 The monopolistic profit of Russia amounts to 
511 m $US. Note, that in our simulations all other hot air regions such as XSU are 
assumed to fully supply their hot air. This “free ride” on the monopoly price caused by 
Russian strategic behavior leads to net gains of about 733 m $US for XSU which are in 
this case higher than those for Russia. At this point, it is left to future studies to examine 
potential collusion between different countries supplying hot air.7 
                                                 
6 See Böhringer and Löschel (2003) and Klepper and Peterson (2005) for a detailed discussion of market 
power in international emissions trading under the existence of hot air. 
7 As noted in the introduction, we do not consider collusive behavior of Russia with XSU as a realistic 
policy option, since XSU consists of 11 politically heterogeneous countries. See Löschel and Zhang (2002) 
for an approach to model strategic behavior of two regions in international climate policy. 
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Table 4: Marginal Abatement Cost in $US (2001) per ton CO2 
 NTr Kyoto-C Kyoto EU-Closed EU-NDIR-Tr EU-RUS 
  NDIR DIR NDIR DIR NDIR DIR
Russia 0     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
XSU* 0     0 2.1 1.9 1.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Canada 61.5     0 2.1 1.9 1.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Japan 23.0     0 2.1 1.9 1.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
European Union** 0-46.9     0 2.1 13.2 2.1 3.0 2.1 3.0 1.2
* Rest of Former Soviet Union (without Russia and the Baltic States). 
** Austria: 16.1, Belgium: 2.1, Germany: 5.4, Denmark: 6.5, Spain: 23.6, Finland: 0, France: 13.3, United 
Kingdom: 2.3, Greece: 11.0, Ireland: 43.6, Italy: 10.7, Netherlands: 3.1, Portugal: 46.9, Sweden: 1.1, Baltic 
States, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia: 0, Rest of Europe: 15.9. 
 
For scenario EU-Closed which captures the hybrid regulation scheme under the EU ETS 
in Europe we obtain three carbon markets. Firstly, the EU ETS market that applies to 
emission-intensive DIR sectors within the EU. Secondly, the carbon market within the 
EU for NDIR sectors which – in this scenario – are not eligible for international 
emissions trading and thirdly, the carbon market for all non-EU Kyoto parties. Due to the 
withdrawal of the EU from the international emissions trading market the price for 
permits is lower compared to scenario Kyoto. Canada and Japan, the two remaining actors 
on the demand side in this scenario, are the beneficiaries of the price decrease. Russia is 
now able to sell only 92 MtCO2 of its hot air, i.e. the Russian profits decrease 
considerably compared to scenario Kyoto. Compliance costs for the EU amount to about 
1300 m $US and are substantially higher than under scenario Kyoto. Aggregate emission 
reduction for all Kyoto parties amounts to 4.8% due to higher abatement efforts by the 
EU. 
In the scenario EU-NDIR-Tr the EU Member States are able to cover permit demand for 
their NDIR sectors also from the Kyoto market. Because of the additional demand the 
permit price on the Kyoto market increases compared to scenario EU-Closed from 1.9 to 
3.0 $US per ton CO2. The Kyoto market access is quite profitable for EU member states 
as they reduce the total compliance costs compared to EU-Closed by 680 m $US, i.e. 
roughly by 50% compared to EU-Closed. These savings correspond to a decline of 
marginal abatement costs for the EU NDIR sectors from 13.2 to 3.0 $US per ton CO2. 
However, due to the increased amount of Russian hot air sold, the environmental 
effectiveness is diminished if the NDIR sectors are allowed to trade on the international 
  12
market. Russia now sells 185 MtCO2 hot air instead of only 92 MtCO2 in scenario EU-
Closed. 
Table 5: Hot Air Supply by Russia 
  Kyoto EU-Closed EU-NDIR-Tr EU-RUS 
in MtCO2 Kyoto market 246 92 185 185 
in MtCO2 EU ETS -- -- -- 65 
in % of total hot air Share 40 15 30 41 
 
Under scenario EU-RUS, Russia can sell hot air either to the Kyoto market or to the DIR 
sectors within the EU ETS. In order to maximize net revenues from selling in both 
markets, Russia realizes a higher price (3.0 $US) in the Kyoto market than in the EU ETS 
(1.2 $US). This indicates that the (point) elasticity of demand in the Kyoto market is 
lower than in the EU ETS (see Appendix). From the Russian point of view, this price 
discrimination is favorable as Russian profits increase from scenario EU-NDIR-Tr to EU-
RUS by about 70 m $US respectively 13%. Therefore, our results indicate that Russia 
indeed has an incentive to join the EU ETS as the country is then able to realize market 
power in two separated permit markets. The use of hot air for the DIR sectors is also 
profitable from the European perspective, since the EU compliance costs are further 
reduced compared to a situation where the EU ETS is not linked to the Kyoto market. 
However, from an environmental point of view the Russian participation on the EU ETS 
leads to a further deterioration because of the higher amount of hot air which flows into 
the EU (additional 65 MtCO2 compared to EU-NDIR-Tr) and the corresponding lower 
permit price in the EU ETS which reduces total abatement in this market.  
6.  Conclusions 
Our simulation shows that the market design of the future international permit trading 
regime has a strong influence on the economic and environmental effects of the Kyoto 
Protocol. In particular, we identify two elements of the market structure – the linkage of 
different permit markets and the strategic behavior of Russia – which seem important for 
an evaluation of any future regime. Given a competitive market, Russian hot air is 
sufficient to make the Kyoto constraint non-binding. However, because of its large 
amount of hot air Russia is the dominant supplier of permits in any future permit market 
and may exert market power, i.e. influence the permit price. Note, that this point has been 
made before in the literature. The innovative contribution of this paper consists of the 
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consideration of the EU ETS under Russian market power within the framework of the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
We find that Russia will have incentives to join the EU ETS if the latter is separated from 
the Kyoto international emissions market. In this case, Russia can exert monopolistic 
price discrimination between two separated markets thereby maximizing revenues from 
hot air sales. The EU will be able to substantially reduce compliance costs if it does not 
restrain itself to EU-internal emission regulation schemes. However, part of the gains 
from extra-EU emissions trading will come at the expense of environmental effectiveness 
as (more) hot air will be drawn in.  
Finally, the allocation of permits between DIR and NDIR sectors within the EU critically 
influences Russia’s potential gains from joining the EU trading scheme. The possible 
price discrimination by Russia due to the separation of the Kyoto market and the EU ETS 
may therefore have implications for the future design of national allocation plans in 
Europe. This detail of the interaction between institutional framework and market 
structure in international climate policy remains a topic for future research. 
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Appendix: Algebraic Model Formulation 
This section provides an algebraic summary of the partial equilibrium model for permit 
trade underlying the simulations above. We begin with the model formulation for a 
competitive system of permit trade without the occurrence of hot air. Second, we show 
how hot air can be accounted for. Third, we lay out the set-up for the case of monopolistic 
permit supply in one market and – finally – in two separated markets. 
Competitive permit trading 
Under competitive permit trading, all countries i are price takers. Each country minimizes 
its compliance costs to some exogenous target level ki. Compliance costs equal the sum of 
abatement costs and the costs of buying permits. In the case of permit sales, the second 
term becomes negative, which means that the country minimizes the cost of abatement 
minus the income from selling permits. Costs are minimized subject to the constraint that 
a country meets its exogenous reduction target, in other words: a country’s initial 
endowment of permits plus the amount of permits bought ( 0>iq ) or sold ( 0<iq ) on the 
market may not exceed the emission target ki: 
( ) iiiiq qPeeCi ⋅+−min  
s.t. iii qke += , 
where 
iC  denotes the abatement cost function for reducing carbon emissions, 
ie  stands for the business-as-usual emissions, 
ie  are the actual emissions, and 
P  is the permit price taken as exogenous. 
The first order conditions for the cost minimization problem is given by 
( ) PeeC iii =−' . 
In the optimum, the price taking countries abate emissions up to a level where their 
marginal abatement costs ( 'iC ) equal the permit price. Total costs of reducing emissions 
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to the overall target level ∑= i ikK  are minimized, since all opportunities for exploiting 
cost differences in abatement across countries are taken. 
A.2 Accounting for hot air 
A country with hot air ( ih ) minimizes costs of abatement minus income from selling 
permits ( 0<iq ): 
( ) iiiiiq qPeehCi ⋅+−+min  
s.t. iii qke += . 
The amount of hot air equals the difference between the emission target and the business-
as-usual emissions: 
iii ehk += . 
The first order condition yields: 
( ) PeehC iiii =−+' . 
The existence of hot air does not change the costs-efficiency property of unrestricted 
competitive permit trading since marginal abatement costs are still equalized. However, 
hot air sold on the permit market does not imply any effective (real) emission reduction in 
the hot air countries. The occurrence of traded hot air, therefore, results in an increase of 
overall emission compared to a situation without international permit trading. 
Monopolistic permit supply in one market 
Monopolistic permit supply is characterized as a situation where one country (denoted 
“m”) – in our case the hot air country Russia – has supply power in the permit market 
while all other countries, denoted as fringe “f”, behave as price takers. The fringe 
countries, thus, minimize their compliance costs given the permit price set by the 
monopolist. They emit carbon until the marginal abatement costs equal the permit price 
of the market, i.e. 
( ) PeehC ffff =−+' . 
The aggregate demand of the fringe, which is in total a net importer of permits, is 
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( ) ( )∑=
f
fF PqPQ . 
The monopolist sets its permit supply ( 0<mq ) to minimize abatement costs minus 
income from permit sales: 
( ) mmmmmq qPeehCm ⋅+−+min  
s.t. mmm qke +=  
( )FQPP =  
where P  is the inverse demand function of the fringe countries. The first order conditions 
of the costs minimization problem indicate that the monopolist sets marginal abatement 
costs equal to marginal revenue: 
( ) ( ) mFmmmm qQPPeehC ⋅−=−+ '' . 
Marginal abatement costs are accordingly not equalized between the fringe countries and 
the monopolists, resulting in overall efficiency losses due to market power. 
Monopolistic permit supply in two markets 
Monopolistic permit supply in scenario EU-RUS is characterized as a situation where one 
country (denoted “m”) – in our case the hot air country Russia – has supply power in two 
separated permit markets.8 All other countries, denoted as fringe “f1” in market 1 and 
“f2” in market 2 behave as price takers. The fringe countries minimize their compliance 
costs given the permit price set by the monopolist. They emit carbon until the marginal 
abatement costs equal the permit price of the corresponding market, i.e. 
( ) 1111' 1 PeehC ffff =−+  and ( ) 2222' 2 PeehC ffff =−+ . 
The aggregate demand of the fringe in both markets, which are in total net importers of 
permits, is 
( ) ( )∑=
1
1111
f
fF PqPQ  and ( ) ( )∑=
2
2222
f
fF PqPQ . 
The monopolist sets its permit supply in both markets ( 01 <mq  and 02 <mq ) to minimize 
abatement costs minus income from permit sales: 
                                                 
8 See Varian (1989). 
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( ) 2211, 21min mmmmmmqq qPqPeehCmm ⋅+⋅+−+  
s.t. mmm qke +=  
      21 mmm qqq +=  
      ( )111 FQPP =  
      ( )222 FQPP = , 
where 1P  and 2P  are the inverse demand functions of the fringe countries in market 1 and 
2. The first order conditions of the costs minimization problem indicate that the 
monopolist sets marginal abatement costs equal to marginal revenue in both markets: 
( ) ( ) 11'11' mFmmmm qQPPeehC ⋅−=−+  and ( ) ( ) 22'22' mFmmmm qQPPeehC ⋅−=−+ . 
Let 1ε  and 2ε  be the elasticity of demand in market 1 and 2, we can write these 
expressions as 
( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −⋅=−+
1
1
' 11 εPeehC mmmm  and ( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −⋅=−+
2
2
' 11 εPeehC mmmm . 
It follows that 21 PP >  if and only if 21 εε < . Hence, the market with the more inelastic 
demand – the market that is less price sensitive – is charged the higher price. 
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Table 6: Coefficients for Marginal Abatement Curves 
 DIR sectors NDIR sectors 
 i,1α  i,2α  i,3α i,1α i,2α  i,3α
RUS 0.6034 -0.0008 0.0001 3.9461 -0.0244 0.0011
XSU 1.1282 -0.0204 0.0006 2.3060 0.0243 0.0012
CAN 2.6176 0.0386 0.0019 4.3542 0.0953 0.0007
JPN 0.7733 0.0040 0.0001 3.9321 0.0527 0.0004
AUT 16.4489 1.0866 0.8126 44.8074 10.0505 2.0624
BEL 3.3541 -0.3797 0.0242 17.0792 1.9634 0.2285
DEU 1.0853 0.0043 0.0001 3.4134 0.1617 -0.0019
DNK 18.6304 -1.6119 3.2171 95.9893 115.7542 -33.8785
FIN 10.2283 0.1559 0.3571 72.2584 28.4968 14.0868
FRA 4.4582 0.0898 0.0108 6.5645 0.2509 0.0005
GBR 1.9926 0.0273 0.0010 4.2733 0.1158 0.0021
GRC 9.7133 -0.1708 0.0748 58.5566 8.8027 2.7891
IRL 10.3267 15.2168 4.9583 83.8419 25.5878 6.9464
ITA 2.4653 0.0412 0.0016 10.7892 0.3566 0.0110
NLD 2.4859 -0.1555 0.0031 16.1308 0.5764 0.0952
PRT 17.5205 2.0198 1.9669 26.8714 122.9196 -42.7560
ESP 3.5267 0.0676 0.0092 14.8199 0.6169 0.0198
SWE 13.0939 -1.0617 1.0209 49.3104 18.7495 3.3653
BAL 30.2165 -10.4277 6.1301 59.0840 21.4185 43.1309
CZE 4.2692 -0.2478 0.0320 18.7241 -1.0535 1.5116
HUN 13.3728 -0.2222 1.0389 42.8616 5.6833 2.9371
POL 2.3028 -0.0033 0.0021 7.1590 0.1783 0.0517
SVK 9.2117 -2.3174 0.7331 72.9121 24.0981 11.4548
XEU 2.7258 -0.0073 0.0042 12.2751 0.5652 0.0290
RUS: Russia, XSU: Rest of Former Soviet Union (without Russia and the Baltic States), CAN: Canada, 
JPN: Japan, AUT: Austria, BEL: Belgium, DNK: Denmark, FIN: Finland, FRA: France, DEU: Germany, 
GBR: United Kingdom, GRC: Greece, IRL: Ireland, ITA: Italy, NLD: Netherlands, PRT: Portugal, ESP: 
Spain, SWE: Sweden, BAL: Baltic States, CZE: Czech Republic, HUN: Hungary, POL: Poland, SVK: 
Slovakia, XEU: Rest of Europe. 
 
